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The health care delivery system is among the most 
extensi.vely regulated sectors of the American economy, 
Professional licensure, hospital ac creditation and certification, 
qualification requirements for federal subsidies, and governmental 
oversight of the third-party payor system constitute a complex 
set of insti.tuti.onal constraints on the structure and performance of 
the hospital industry [see Somers] .  Beginning about a decade ago, 
serious demands have been made -- notably by some of the trade 
associations and professional societies in the industry -- to complete 
the circle of regulation by establishing administrative agencies, at 
either the state or federal level, to subject the industry to "public 
utility" regulatlon, These pressures have yi.elded results: most 
states have either established hospital regulation, or are considering 
legislation that would ac complish that end. 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the causes and likely 
consequences of hospital regulation. Its point of departure is not the 
actual operation of the health care delivery system in the United 
States. Instead, the starting point is a growing body of literature 
in economics, law and political science on the operation and 
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performance of regulation generally. The first section presents some 
general observations on the factors that cause regulatory agencies to be 
established and that influence the outcomes of regulatory procedur.�s. 
The second section describes some of the problems that seem to recur 
in regulated industries, and why these are probably inevitable conse­
quences of imposing regulation. The third section applies these general 
theoretical and empirical observations to the specific case of the ni.edi.cal 
care delivery system and offers some conclusions about the relative 
merits of alternc.tive methods of government intervention in the industry. 
At the outset, several disclaimers must be made. This paper 
is not a defense of unrestrained private enterprise i.n medical care de­
livery. The nature of medical services probably requires some gov­
ernmental interference in the market to counterbalance the difficulty 
most consumers would have in making informed, rational judgments about 
the effectiveness of alternative methods of treatment. The problern of 
an unfettered market is, furthermore, undoubtedly exacerbated by the 
fact that, due to insurance and federal subsidies, most medical costs 
are not borne directly by patients. This gives patients little i.ncenl:ive 
to consider costs in making decisions to obtain medical services - � 
the problem of 1'moral hazard" common to insurance systems in which 
the insurable risk is to some degree determined by decisions made by 
the insured party [ see Arrow, Pauly]. Finally, even if these other 
problems could be neglected, society has every right to decide thal: 
certai.n goods apd services - - education, food, decent housing, 
medical services -- are available to some minimum acceptable 
degree to all c itizens, regardless of ability to pay. 
The issue to be joined here is the choice among alternative 
arrangements for achieving society's objectives with regard to medical 
care. In particular, what aspects of medical care delivery are 
reasonably we1J. served by a decentralized system relying on market 
incentives, and what other a-spects are good candidates for some 
degree of insulati.on through centralized decision-making fro1n norznal 
market mechanisms? 
I. Theoretical Models of Regulation 
The conventional wisdom on what regulatory authorities 
do and why the)' are established flows from the political attitudes 
of the turn-of-the-century progressive movement. According to 
the traditional view, the purpose of regulation is to protect society 
from abuses of market power and from other types of market failure 
that seem endemic to certain industries that supply key goods and 
servic(�s [see Wilcox]. American society is seen as largely 
homogenous, so that a clearly defined public interest exists and 
can be identified. The role of the regulator is to make certain 
that firms supplying services of great national importance serve 
this public interest: that market power or consumer ignorance is 
not used to enrich a relatively few businessmen while sacrificing 
the general welfare. 
Regulatory institutions are argued to be necessary 
because in some industries competition cannot be relied on as a 
means for obtaining optimal price, output and quality. This can 
occur for any of several reasons: due to economies of scale, the 
most efficient size of a firm may be very large compared to the 
size of the industry (the ' 1natural monopoly'1 case); wide, unpre­
dictable fluctuations in supply or demand conditions within an 
industry may make it too risky to be attractive to many entre­
preneurs unless  they can earn abnormally high returns (the 
' 1 ruinous competition" case); or the coni.plexity of the product 
or service may be so great that consumers cannot reasonably 
be expected to make competent market judgments (the 1 1consumer 
protection11 case). 
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The forms of regulation that have evolved are enormously 
varied. "Public utility'1 regulation normally refers to controlling 
prices, profits and the entry and exit of firms from the industry. 
In the traditional conceptualization, this form of regulation is paired 
with the "natural monopoly" case: a firm is prevented from ex­
ploiting its position in a market in which there are none or few 
competitors by forcing it to serve more customers at lower prices 
and p rofits than it would otherwise freely choose. But public 
utility regulation is by no means limited to natural monopolies: 
interstate trucking, air transportation and pipelines are federally 
regulated, and i.n mosl: cities so are taxicabs .  Yet all are, at 
least in the markets that generate most of the industries ' sales, 
certainly no les s  competitive than many unregulated industries. 
In fact, thi.s puzzling circumstance of extensive regulation of at 
least rivalrous if not competitive industries is an important source 
of dissatisfaction with traditional theory. 
Another source of criticism of the traditional explanation is 
its failure to explain why entry control is a necessary component 
of regulation. If one purpose of regulation is to suppress prices 
so that monopoly profits cannot be made, then firms should not 
find entry into regulated markets attractive. In particular, if 
prices no more than just recover costs and if a firm enjoys 
economies of scale, the best outcome an entrant could achieve 
would be to sustain losses until the entrenched firm went bankrupt 
and then just to cover costs {and never recover the losses incurred 
while two firms were operating). Nevertheles s ,  firms persistently 
have tried to enter virtually every regulated industry - - not just 
the regulated co1npetitive industries like trucking and taxi service, 
but also the so-called 1'natural monopolies, 11 such as long-distance 
telecommunications and retail electric power distribution. 
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These dissatisfactions with traditional explanations of 
regulation have generated several new theoretical generalizations 
about its genesis and operation. 
Capture Theories 
The most radical theoretical proposition is that regulation 
is an institution proposed and supported by regulated industries as 
a mechanism for supplanting competition with a legal, enforceable 
cartel. This is the antithesis of the traditional view that regulation 
is established to protect consumers. Instead of an institution that 
forces monopolists or oligopoli.sts to behave more or less as if 
there were competition, this theory pictures regulation as a means 
by which competitors can behave as if they were monopolists by 
making enforceable agreements to divide markets, reduce output, 
and raise profits.�' The distinction is made apparent by comparing 
* In essentially contemporaneous studies, Kolko and MacAvoy, 
Economic Effects, first offered this theory as an explanation of the 
formation and development of the Interstate Commerce Commission. 
Recently Davis and North have further generalized the theory to 
incorporate all coercive governmental institutions that create wealth 
for some subgroup of the population, 
the explanations the two theories would have for the presence of 
regulation in any particular industry. For example, traditionalists 
would hold that the Federal Communications Con1mission regulates 
the interstate telecommunications industry (which, without doing 
any great violence to reality, is essentially comprised of a single 
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firm, the American Telephone and Telegraph Company) because 
interstate telecommunications service is a natural monopoly, and hence 
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without regulation would have exorbidant prices. Those who favor the cartel 
explanation woulcl contend that the FCC i.s a device for preventing 
competition in telecommunications, being controlled by the Bell 
system for the purpose of maintaining its monopoly position, 
prices and profits, 
Of course, politicians do not legalize cartels without 
a quid pro quo. Seeking reelection, politicians exact a "price'1 
from the regulated industry: campaign contributions, and the 
establishment of an oversight agency that, while sympathetic to 
the regulated firms, can put some bounds on the behavior of the 
regulated that prevents cartel practices from being a political 
liability (see Stigler). For example, a professional group will, 
according to the theory, gain the right to limit entry into its 
business, but only by accepting some responsibility for assuring 
minimum levels of competance among its members. 
Political Economic Theory 
A similar but more elaborate model of regulation, based 
upon some rather recent ideas in economics and politi.cal science, 
sees the relationship between regulators and regulated firms as 
more complex and dynamic. Like the traditionalists, those who 
subscribe to this political-economic theory assume that regulators 
try to serve some concept of the general public interest, rather than 
act as conduits for the interests of regulated firms. The problem 
regulators face is to identi.fy this general public interest in a 
milieu in which information is uncertain, expensive and biased, 
and in a society which contains numerous groups whose interests 
are conflicting rather than harmonious.':' 
For a more developed explanation, see Noll, Reforming Regulation. 
The political economic theory focuses on the succe s s  
indicators available to regulators to a s s e s s  their own performance. 
To a private enterprise ,  the best indicator of success is usually 
the firtn.1 s long-term profitability! or perhaps its sales. To a
district attorney, it probably is convictions won; and to a politician, 
continu,ed reelection. 
To a regulatory authority, several success indicators 
are available. First is the extent to which its decisions 
are overridden by appeals to the courts. Second is the 
response of legislators to agency decis ions : do they pass bills that 
change an agency's decis ion, and do they react favorably to proposals 
to increase the authority and the 1.;>udget of the agency? A third 
succes�; indicator is the performance of the regulated industry. A 
catacly.smic service failure , such as the northeast power blackout 
of the n:iid-1960s, is likely to be blamed at least in part on the 
regulators, as is financial failure by several firms in the industry 
(such as has occurred in the railroad industry). 
All three success  indicators lead to s erious biases in 
regulatory outcomes .  Obviously, the fear of financial and service 
failures creates an incentive to promote the intere sts of the regulated 
firms. Healthy profits prevent financial catastrophes, and provide 
funds for rapid adjustments in industry operations if service should 
prove seriously inadequate. 
More subtle is the bias inherent in the methods by which 
agencies collect information for reaching decisions and by which 
groups dissatisfied with agency decisions appeal to the courts or 
the legislature for a reversal. This bias arises from the costs 
of dealing with the regulatory s ystem. Being represented in a 
regulatory proceeding is expensive. Proceedings can drag on for 
years v.·hen an i1nportant issue is at stake, and maintaining adequate 
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representation can involve heavy use of expensive profes s ionals -­
lawyers, engineers , e conomists, etc. Then, once a decision has 
been reached, appeals to the courts - - requiring more experts - -
and to congres smen -- certainly made more effe ctive by campaign 
contributions -- generate even more costs. An individual or an 
organized group (a firm, a trade association, a union) wishing 
to affect regulatory outcomes must be prepared to defray the s e  
costs o f  dealing with regulators,  fighting court cases ,  and lobbying 
politicians. If a group is not already organized (for example , the 
nonexistent _t\ssociation of Interstate Air Travelers), the costs of 
entering the regulatory proce s s  are even higher, for it must become 
organized in order to put together effective representation. In 
order for any group or individual to find entering the regulatory 
process  worthwhile, it must expect its benefits to exceed these 
battle costs. 
In general, the larger a group, the more expensive it is 
for the group to become organized to represent its members in an 
adversary process. And, in general, an individual is more likely 
to join a voluntary association if his stake i.n the service provided 
by the assoc iation is high and if the interest group of which he is a 
member is s mall enough so that his participation has an important 
effect on the succe s s  of the association [see Olson]. Thus ,  an 
adversary system is more likely to be entered by a small group 
with a large per capita stake in the issue at hand than by a large 
group with a small per capita interest. 
Obviously regulated firms have a great deal at stake in 
regulatory proceedings, and they will choose to be effectively 
represented. A few customer groups who use a service extensively 
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may also be organized and enter the proce s s ,  such as a local government 
whose jurisdiction is about to be abandoned by a railroad or a 
manufacturing trade association whose members 1 product is about 
to be subjected to a freight rate increase. The stake of the general 
public may be even greater than any of these groups, but it is 
diffused over a large number of unorganized individuals. To a 
single consumer, any one regulatory issue is likely to be far down 
the list of public concerns. A consumer is unlikely to cast votes 
or make campaign contributions on the basis of an ICC de cision 
on railroad freight charges, or even to pay a few dollars to support 
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a Washington lobbyist who w.ill represent consumer interests before 
the ICC. Consequently, the information presented to a regulatory 
authority during its deliberations is likely to come almost exclusively 
from special interests. In addition, only these special interests 
will usually pose a serious threat to appeal the agency1s decision 
to the courts or the legislature. 
All of these factors cause regulators to devote most of 
their attention to the effects of their policies on regulated firms 
and other well-represented special interest groups. First, the 
information flowing to the agency will be systemmatically biased 
against unrepresented groups as a natural consequence of the adversary 
system. Second, to minimize the chance of being overturned by the 
courts or the legislature, the agency will be inclined to make 
decisions that somewhat favor represented gro�s. This reduces 
the chance that a de cision will be appealed by giving a represented 
group something to lose if the outcome of the appeal is unfavorable. 
If more than one group is well-represented on a particular issue 
the agency will first engage in excruciatingly long proceedings to 
gather information and make a decision. This makes partic ipating 
in the process even more costly, so that some groups may go bankrupt 
and drop out, and also postpones the day when the inevitable appeal 
must be fought. \V-hen the decision is finally reached, the agency 
will seek a compromise between the we ll-represented groups, 
giving them all some stake in the decision, which reduces the 
incentive anyone will have to appeal, and improves the agency1s 
ability to defend its actions as "fair. " 
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Legislators play an important role in the regulatory process. The 
legislators, being elected, are seen by regulators as an important embodiment 
of the public will. Yet the contact regulators have with the 
legislature is generally restricted to a few members of subcommittees 
that oversee the agency1s program and budget -- a relatively small 
proportion of the total legislature. Policies that contribute to the 
re-election of a few subcommittee members may not necessarily 
be those that could gain majority support in the legislature, but they 
may be instituted in any event through the informal relations betv.'een 
regulators and subcommittee members.�' To a regulator, no practical 
* For a description of this process vis -2L-vis the National Labor
Relations Board, see Scher. More generally, see Wildavsky. 
distinction among pressures exerted by a legislator can be made on 
the basis of the legislator's motive, whether it be the improved 
efficiency of the regulated sector, the welfare of his constituents, 
or the profits of a contributor to his reelection campaign. In addition, 
the extent to which legislators can respond to special interest pleadings 
is greater in regulatory affairs than in the normal legislative process 
since the latter creates a more complete public record. For all 
these reasons, the subcommittee member is likely to be a very 
imperfect reflection of the balance among all interests in a regulatory 
issue, yet he is the only such indicator usually available to the agency. 
IL Empirical Observations on Regulatory Outcomes 
The traditional and revisionist theoretical propositions 
outlined above have quite different implications for the actual 
perforrnance of the regulated industry. The traditional view predicts 
that regulation will cause prices to be lower than they would be 
without regulation: that to some degree regulation will eliminate 
some of the inefficiency due to monopolistic business practices. 
The theory that regulation is a device to create a cartel has 
the o pposite prediction. A regulated industry would be characterized 
by high.er prices, higher profits and less output than would prevail 
without regulation. The political-economic theory embellishes the 
cartel theory, making similar predictions when only the regulated 
industry is represented in the regulator}" process, but going on to 
predict that in conflict situations the regulators will go to some 
lengths to strike compromises among various represented groups, 
even though the consequences of the decision may be inefficient 
industry operations and higher prices to consumers. 
Although the verdict is far from complete, the economics 
literature provides some revealing findings about the accuracy o f  
these p:redictions. Economists have analyzed demand and cost 
conditions in several regulated industries and numerous pricing and 
profit decisions by regulatory agencies. Except in the case of the 
regulation of natural gas prices at the wellhead, no depressing 
effect of regulation on prices has been found, For example, retail 
electric: and gas prices do not differ between the group of states that 
regulates retail power and the group that does not [see MacAvoy, 
"Effectiveness, 11 and Moore], Airline fares in the intrastate 
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markets in California, where minimum price regulation has not 
been practiced, are less than half the fares charged in interstate 
routes of similar length and passenger density that are regulated 
b)[._the Civil Aeronautics Board [see Levine}. Pipe_line tariffs in 
regulated interstate markets are not only higher than in the 
unregulated intrastate markets, but apparently in some cases even 
s·ornewhat higher than an unconstrained monopolist would charge 
(see MacAvoy and Noll] . 
Natural gas field prices are the main exception, being held 
considerably below the best estimates of the prices that would prevail 
in a competitive, unregulated market. But the explanation follows 
from the fact that the buyers of gas at the well-head -- the pipelines 
are themselves regulated. Here the relevant regulatory authority 
(the Federal Power Commission) is faced with the classic dilemma of 
arbitrating a conflict of interest between regulated groups. The 
response of the FPC to this dilemma was, first, to refuse to regulate 
the industry until forced to do so by congress and the courts, and 
second, to take years to make the initial decision as to how gas 
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prices would be regulated. The resulting situation -- a reduction of 
prices below the cost of supplying new gas - - has not benefited 
consumers. To the contrary, prices set below the costs of new gas 
cause as troublesome inefficiencies as the artificially high prices 
charged by a monopoly. Below-cost prices have fostered uneconomically 
profligate use of the known reserves of the only fossil fuel that does 
not create serious environmental problems, have caused shortages 
that prevent new customers from gaining access to gas \vho -,vould 
be willing to purchase it at a price high enough to justify opening 
new reserves, and have threatened existing customers with the 
possibility that their principal home fuel supply will disappear if 
the growing gas s hortage causes the supplies of their retailer to 
be cut off.* 
* This paragraph is a condensation of arguments offered by
MacAvoy, 11Regulation-Induced. 11 
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Thus the empirical evidence clearly contradicts the traditional 
view of regulation. Whatever regulators do, they apparently do .!!£_t in 
general reduce prices below the level that would otherwise prevail due 
to imperfectly competitive markets. At the same time, few studies 
have found any tendency of regulated firms to earn exorbitant 
profits . Returns to equity in regulated industries are for the most 
pa·rt below returns in other sectors of the economy; the common stock 
in regulated firrns rarely has shown a iong-term tendency to rise as 
rapidly as stock prices generally. These observations mean one of 
two things: either regulation performs no function at all (that is , it 
has no effect on prices or profits because regulated industries are 
sufficiently competitive to hold these to reasonable levels) or regulation 
succeeds not in lowering prices so that profits w ill resemble those in 
competition, but instead in raising costs so that the potential 
profitability of monopoly pricing is eroded away. A further examination 
of some other activities of regulators indicates that the latter is more 
likely to be the case. 
Consumer Cros s-Subsidization 
One important regulatory policy that erodes the profit of 
monopoly pricing is the use of the price structure as an elaborate 
tax-subsidy scheme [see Posner]. Regulators will permit monopoly
pricing in profitable markets, but then force regulated firms to 
offer services in uneconomic markets that would be abandoned 
without regulatory intervention. Telephone service, electric power 
and transportation are all priced with this consumer cross­
subsidization in mind. 
A s  mentioned before, prices are substantially lower in the 
California intrastate airline market than for similar interstate 
routes regulated by the CAB. Yet interstate airlines do not earn 
especially high profits. One reason is that CAB has forced ther:n to 
serve numerous cities that generate so little air traffic that to serve 
them is highly unprofitable [see Eads]. Thus, the air traveler
flying between two large cities -- say, from Chicago to New York 
not only pays for the cost of his flight, but he also pays part of the 
coSt.s of flying another passenger between two smaller cities [see 
Keeler}.* The CAB, like other regulatory agencies, has justifi,ed 
* Several years ago a regional air carrier ran advertisements in
the New York Times that began with the highly relevant query: "What 
is Ozark doing in New York?" The answer, of course, is that the 
CAB was trying to find a way for Ozark to make up the losses from 
being in Joplin and Fort Leonard Wood. 
consumer cross-subsidization on the grounds that the nnational 
interest11 requires that as many cities as possble be provided airline 
service, and that this is a more important objective than running an 
efficient national airline system. Critics of this policy respond 
that passengers on profitable route s ,  having no greater interest 
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than does society generally in subsidizing service to small towns ,  
should not be  forced to bear the entire burden of the subsidy, assuming 
it is justified. They also question \.vhether subsidies should be paid, 
pointing out that nowhere in the CAB's legislative mandate is it 
directed to maximize the number of cities offered service. 
The historical development of cross-subsidization by the 
CAB illustrates the interplay between regulatory policy-making 
and interest groups. Initially, in response to pressure from 
represe:ntatives of less populous areas, Congress favored service 
to cities generating little traffic, and provided subsidies, both 
indirectly through mail contracts and directly through the CAB, 
to achieve that end. The airlines also favored the maintenance_ of 
unprofitable routes -since regulation limited their profits to a fixed 
1*fair11 return on investment. The more routes flown, the greater 
the investment and allowed profit of an airline, and the better the 
prOspects for future growth, investments and, hence, profits. 
As the nation's population became more concentrated in large urban 
centers,. Congress looked with decreasing favor on the a irline 
subsidy,, directing the CAB to work towards eliminating it. Yet 
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many congressmen wanted service to their constituents in small 
cities to continue, as did the local governm.ents and major businesses 
in these areas as \\1ell as the airlines. Cross-subsidization satisfied 
all these groups, at the expense of the passenger on major trunk 
routes ""ho was unorganized and unlikely to res pond to a hidden tax 
on air fa.res (from whence came the cross-subsidy) by making campaign 
contributions, casting ballots in congressional elections, or entering 
court appeals to bend policy more in his favor. 
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Producer Protection 
The price structure can also be used by regulators to sub­
sidize certain producers as well as particular groups of consumers. 
Regulatory agencies often set prices designed to prevent low-cost firrns 
or industries from capturing business from high-cost competitors. Most 
often this occurs when alternative technologies have differing costs for 
each of several categories of service and the regulators decide not to 
let the firms employing these technologies specialize according to the 
service that each technology can offer with greatest efficiency. 
Surface transportation is an interesting case in point [ see 
Friedlaender]. Railroads, water carriers and trucks usually face 
entirely different costs for providing a given service in a given market. 
If boats, trucks and trains were to be used to best advantage, all would 
charge a price related to cost for each service, and shippers would then 
choose among transportation modes according to their relative efficiency. 
Yet the Interstate Commerce Commission, in an attempt to preserve for 
each mode some of the market for each type of shipment, often sets prices 
at the same level for all modes and requires that firms as "common 
carriers" accept shipments at those prices. Sometimes the price is 
below the cost of the high-cost mode, so that firms are forced to accept 
shipments that do not cover costs even though another firm using a dif­
ferent transportation technology could earn a profit on the same shipment 
at the same price. Sometimes the price is high enough so that all three 
technologies can cover costs, including the technology with the highe£t 
cost. 
This practice is defended on the grounds that the national 
interest demands a 11balanced" transportation system, giving as many 
shippers as possible a choice of transportation modes. The concept 
of unregulated monopolization of a market by a particular firm is 
implied to be equivalent to the concept of regulated monopolization 
of a market by an industry. For instance, a price decision will 
be said to prevent monopolization of a service by trucks. But 
were it not for regulation trucking would be a competitive industry. 
Furthermore trucking is regulated which, in theory at least,. is 
supposed to afford protection against monopolization in any event. 
The -argument against this policy is simply that regulation 
prevents shippers from capturing the benefits of a lower-cost s ervice 
because it breaks the connection between cost and price. Even if the 
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national interest does require continuation of a service or preservation 
of a firm that customers do not want to patronize, the burden of 
maintaining it should not fall on shippers who favor services that are 
profitable, but upon society generally. 
Influencing Technological Change 
By controlling prices, profits and entry in an industry, 
regulatory agencies also control the rate and pattern of technological 
change, In particular, regulatory agencies have delayed or prevented 
many beneficial technological innovations, and have promoted or 
permitted many others that were not justified [see Capron]. 
Thwarting a promising innovation frequently occurs when 
a technological change threatens to shift substantial business from 
one regulated firm to another or to cause the profits of a regulated 
industry to decline. The Federal Communications Commis sion 
provides several examples of this behavior: the long-standing prohibition 
(recently reversed) of foreign attachments -- i. e. , devices made by 
someone other' than AT&T -- to the switched telephone network; the 
decade-long delay in authorizing a domestic communications satellite; 
and the restrictions on the development of pay-television and cable 
television (see Noll, Peck and McGowan]. In all cases the new 
technology promises to offer new services that consumers have 
demonstrated a willingness to pay for, and old services at a 
substantial reduction in cost. Yet in all cases those who would 
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own and profit from development of the new technologies differ frorn 
those who own and profit from the old: foreign attachments and 
domestic satellites threaten the Bell monopoly, pay-TV and cable TV 
threaten the highly profitable tight oligopoly enjoyed by VHF television 
stations in large cities as well as what remains of the motion picture 
and live theatre industries. Even though neither AT&T nor VHF 
broadcasters would be forced out of business by a more permissive 
policy, the. fact that they would be damaged due to the loss of some of 
their insulation from competition is regarded as sufficient cause 
by the FCC to prevent, delay 01· severely limit an economlcally 
wa"rranted technological advance. Meanwhile the resources of the 
potential entrants for dealing with regulators, the Congress and the 
courts are far fewer than those of the entrenched firms, partly 
because they have no profitable existing markets to finance their 
operations and partly because many of those who would profit from 
new technology have yet to emerge, 
Transportation regulation also abounds with similar examples. 
For instance, the piggybacking case illustrates, a penchant for tinkering 
with technology by the ICC (see Gellman1s paper in Capron] . The ICC's Rail 
Form A s pecifies the minimum revenue that a railroad flatcar must 
earn when fully loaded. When the railroads introduced piggybacking, 
or carrying truck freight on a railroad flatcar, the ICC insisted that 
the piggyback flatcars satisfy the Rail Form A revenue requirements. 
This decision forced the railroads not only to charge a higher price 
for piggybacking than they would otherwise have levied, but also to 
adopt an inferior method of providing the service. In providing 
piggyback se rvice, the railroads faced a two-dimensional technical 
decision. The first concerned the length of the flatcar: should it 
be large enough to carry one or two truckloads? The second 
concerned the part of the truck to be carried: should the entire 
truck-trailer be carried (including the wheels) or just the freight 
container? The lowe st-cost alternative for most railroads was to 
carry only the container and to use short flatcars that could carry 
only one truckload. Securing a container to a flatcar is easier than 
securing a wheeled trailer ,  and the shorter car is more s table on 
steeply hanked roadbeds, can manage the sharpest curves in tunnels 
w ithout s craping the walls, is compatible with normal rail yard 
switching equipment, and requires no excess capacity if an odd 
number of trucks is to be carried. But by insisting that :form A 
rai:e s  be used, the ICC prevented the low-cost method frotn being 
adopted, since the Form A revenue requirement for a one-truck 
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car was far too high to induce truckers to use piggybacking. Because 
the price per tl'uck on a double-tl'uck car could, accol'ding to Form A ,  
be half the rate on a single-truck car, the railroads were forced to 
adopt the former des pite the fact that to do so neces sitated redigging 
tunnel s ,  rebanking curve s ,  and redesigning switchyards, And since 
the pricE� on a flatcar transporting whole trailers could not differ 
from the price on flatcars transporting only the freight container, 
railroads were legally barred from giving the trucking industry a 
financial incentive to use trucks with removable containers,  even 
though the cost savings from flatcars for removable containers 
were more than enough to make up for the extra costs of  making 
trailer containe rs removable. Thus,  the full cost advantage of the 
piggyback innovation could not be captured, and that which was 
captured could not be fully reflected in prices, This served partly, 
but not v.·holly, to inhibit the innovation. Rails did capture some 
long-distance traffic from trucks and v.1aterways, but le ss than was 
e conomically warranted by the economics of the innovation. And 
in the proce ss ,  the distribution of busine s s  and profits among 
transport modes was upset less than Would otherwise have been the 
case. The main loser was the consume r,  since commodity prices 
subsequently included unnecessarily high freight costs. 
Another source of the reluctance of regulators to permit 
innovation arises from the uncertainty inherent in change. A new 
technology may be expected to produce great benefits, but usually 
there is a chance that it can cause a deterioration in some aspect 
of service. The agency faces an as ymmetric penalty to making 
mistakes in such circurnstances,  Preventing a technology that would 
haVe been worthwhile may gene rate criticism, but at least the 
criticisms \Vill be based on conjectural information on the 
uncertain potential of the nev.· technology. And at least some 
of those who would have benefited from the technology 
will not be a source of criticism since they will not have reaJized 
their potential gains. On the other hand, adopting a technology that 
is not succes sful leads to the more informed ,  diverse criticism of 
hindsight. The agency will share the blame for service failure , 
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and will be criticized ·by those who lost business because the r.e•.v 
technology was adopted. Furthe rmore, associated with even an 
unsuccessful technology that is adopted will be some firms and workers 
whose welfare clepends on its continued use. These groups represent 
one more voice to be re ckoned with by the agency. 
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These asymmetric costs of mistakes give agencies an 
incentive to exercise excessive caution when dealing with techno­
logical innovations. They will tend to block or to retard innovations 
that threaten entrenched interests. Even when the new technology 
is proposed by entrenched interests and is not expected to redistribute 
income against any of the agency1s well-represented clients, they 
will tend to delay decisions in an attempt to acquire more information 
and thereby reduce uncertainties about the possible detrimental 
consequences of an innovation. 
Regulation-Induced Inefficiency 
The presence of regulation, by altering the incentives faced 
by firms, also damages the efficiency- of their operations. First, 
the profit ceiling imposed upon regulated firms is usually based upon 
costs. In trucking, for example, firms mar earn profits up to a 
fixed proportion of total costs, while in telecommunications firms 
may earn profits equal to a fixed percentage of the depreciated book 
value of their capital investments. Of course, this means that a 
firm can earn greater profits only if it incurs greater costs, which 
blunts the normal business incentive to produce output at the minimum 
possible expense [see Averch and Johnson]. 
Second, the policies of regulators that force firms to 
operate in uneconomic markets, that protect inefficient firms from 
competition, and that retard technological developments that threaten 
to redistribute business among firms create an atmosphere among 
entrepreneurs that is not conducive to innovation, creativity and 
efficiency. Since the second world war, the railroad industry has 
been roundly criticized for poor management, and certainly judging 
from developments in rail transport in Europe and Japan, the criticisms 
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appear to have some foundation. 
The decline in railroad management followed shortly after 
the ICC was given the responsibility to regulate trucking. In the 
absence of regulation, the expected consequenc e  of the technological 
development of trucking i n  the 1920s and 130s would have been sorne 
specialization of services by each mode and some retaliatory inno­
vation by the rails. But the ICC1s policies of preventing truck-rail 
competition and of forcing the rails to continue shipping some cornmo­
dities and serving son1e communities after the rise of trucking ha.d 
made these inefficient for rail service must have played some role 
in undermining the entrepreneurial spirit in the railroad business. 
Finally, attempts to regulate competition inevitably lead 
to a 11tar-body11 effect of increasingly complex regulatory constraints 
[see McKie] . When regulators protect a weak competitor or 
generate extra profits for cross-subsidization in a competitive 
ma
.
rket, they generally succeed more in changing the arena of 
competition rather than in preventing it. Disallowed from competing 
through price reductions, firn�s will turn to improvements in service 
quality -- improvements that, without price controls, consumers 
would not be willing to pay for -- as a mechanism for obtaining more 
customers. In the airline industry, for example, high prices on 
profitable routes bave lead to more frequent flights (with fewer pa.ssen­
gers per flight) and increases in i.n-flight services ( see Eads1 paper in Phil-
lips] . Since these service improvements increase costs, they erode 
the profits for cross-subsidization. To preserve unprofitable routes, 
the CAB must impose restrictions on service competition - - by 
arbitrating mutual reductions in flights among competing airlines, 
by insisting that airlines charge for movies and alcoholic beverages 
that initially are given away, and even by defining the maximum 
square inches of a tourist-class seat. And, as each new avenue 
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of competition is closed off, creative businessmen discover another, 
the 11piano bar'1 being the latest. This unending sequence of innovative 
competition and regulatory response is the counterpart in regulation 
of Brer Rabbit's uncommunicative, sticky stranger. 
The Costs of Regulation 
The preceding discussion reveals what regulation does and 
does not do: generally regulators do not prevent monopoly prices. 
In fact to s.ome extent they encourage monopoly prices as a kind of 
sales tax to finance 11good works11 by regulated firms in the form of 
subsidies to uneconomic services, firms and technologies. (We can 
all
. 
give thanks that the ICC was not established in the 1860s, or else 
we probably would still receive some of our rr1ail by Pony Express.) 
The discussion as yet contains no indication of the magnitude 
of the inef:ficiencies attendant to regulation. Some work has been 
done in this area, although the results are by no means complete. 
First, the costs of operating the major federal public 
utility regulatory agencies -- the SEC, the FCC, the ICC, the CAB 
and the FflC probably approach $1 billion annually. The agencies 
have budgets of about $25 million each, and the firms that are 
regulated probably spend several times as much . in dealing with the 
agencies, the courts and the congress on regulatory matters. Much 
of this expenditure is for pro forma, unproductive activities [see 
MacAvoy, "Formal Work-Product"}, 
Second, several estimates indicate that the costs of regulation 
in terms of the losses in efficiency of regulated firms is even higher 
than the direct cost of running the institution. For example, ICC 
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regulation of surface freight transportation has been estimated to 
cost $5 billion annually, due to the shift from lower-cost to higher-cost 
modes caused by inconsistent cost-price relationships among the modes [ see 
Moore1s paper in Phillips]. The costs of ar� irrational pricing structure in 
air transportation probably are of a similar nl .agnitutle [ see Keeler] . 
Thus, the unnecessary costs created by regulators are not minor; 
indeed they may account for twenty-five to fifty percent of the 
revenues of regulated firms.* It is at least open to debate whether 
* See Green for a more complete survey of the literature examining
the costs of regulation. 
the American public, if given the opportunity, would cast a favorable 
vote on the proposition that the stability and uneconomic services 
re.sulting from regulation are worth this cost. 
The inefficiencies attendant to regulation provide an 
explanation for why regulators are compelled to control entry 
explanation that, as remarked before, eludes traditional theory. 
an 
If prices in some regulated markets produce profits above those 
that are necessary to keep a firm in business in the long run so that 
eras s -subsidies can be pa id, inefficient firms can be pre served, 
regulation-induced costs can be covered or inferior technologies 
continued in use, then regulators must control entry. High profits, 
or the potential for profit with more efficient operation, will attract 
new firms. Their uncontrolled entry would lead to a loss of business 
by the firms internally subsidizing losing markets, or for some 
other reason favored by the regulators, To protect inefficient 
operations and cross -subsidies, further division of the market 
through entry must be prevented. 
III. The Implications for Hospital Regulation 
Quite obviously, the preceding arguments hardly lead to 
happy conclusions about the consequences of public utility regulation 
of hospitals. The two principle conclusions to be extracted from the 
above discussion are: (1) Regulation tends to protect regulated firms 
whenever competition or technological change threatens established 
positions v:ithin the industry, and (2) Regulators see the purpose of 
the price structure as providing a mechanism for taxing s
,
ome groups 
and subsidizing others, rather than as a mechanism for offering 
incentives to buyers and sellers to rationalize choices among inputs, 
outputs and technologies. Thus, if the pattern extends to public utility 
regulation of hospitals , the following results could be expected to obtain: 
(!)'Resistance by regulators to innovations in medical care delivery 
systems (such as prepaid group health plans) regardless of their 
merits; (2) Substantial consumer eras s -subsidization and producer 
protectionism in the price structure; and (3) Persistent upward 
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drift in prices towards monopolistic levels in order to finance subsidies 
and inefficiencies created by regulation. 
The preceding description is reminiscent of the current 
situation in the hospital industry. The medical economics literature 
is replete with claims that existing regulatory practices in the 
industry produce all of these results. Professional licensure and 
hospital certification institutionalize existing medical technology, 
in part because they prevent using different combinations of inputs 
to provide a given service and in part because medical malpractice 
judgments are to some extent based upon the standards for licensure 
and certification [see Carlson and Elwood, et al} . Similarly, the 
straightforward cost-reimbursement system by which third-party 
payors, particularly Blue Cross and the federal government, 
determine how much hospitals should be paid eliminates financial 
incentives to be efficient or to introduce cost-saving innovations 
[see Somers}. 
Those "vho favor even greater regulation of hospitals argue 
as follows [see Priest]. First, the failures of regulation in other 
areas are irrelevant to the hospital case because hospitals are 
almost exclusively nonprofit institutions. Second, regulation is 
necessary because the unusual relationships among hospitals, 
doctors, patients and payors prevents normal market incentives 
from working. Third, the problems of oversensitivity to regulated 
firms discussed above are said to be mitigated by the presence of 
strong, well-organized groups on the other side of the market. 
Fourth, the failures of the incomplete, weak regulation that hospitals 
noW experience are due to the fact that regulation of hospitals has 
not been complete enough and bas not been enforced by strong 
administrative agencies. 
Nonprofit Status 
The nonprofit status of hospitals is, in reality, not of 
major consequence. 
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First, the nonprofit status of hospitals is not unique. 
Nonprofit, governmentally-owned enterprises are common in the 
electric utility and local transportation industries. Although nonprofit 
firms tend to charge somewhat lower prices, this is largely explained 
by their favored tax status. The main beneficiaries of nonprofit 
status appear to be employees, since nonprofit firms apparently p.ay 
higher wages.'� Nonprofit firms are also somewhat less prone to practice 
* See Harnerrnesh and Pashigian. Feldstein also finds a causal
relation from prices and profits to wages and salaries among nonprofit 
hospitals. 
price discrimination [see Pashigian and Peltzman]. Nevertheless, 
these d:Lfferences among profit and nonprofit enterprise in other 
regulat1;:d industries are small. 
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Second, most of the inefficiencies due to regulation arise 
from the policies of the regulators, not of the regulated firm. Cross­
subsidi:�ation, producer protection, and overly cautious attitudes 
about innovation all are aided and abetted, if not initially conceived, 
by the regulators. 
Third, the profit-nonprofit distinction probably has far less 
impact on most operating decision than operators of nonprofit 
institutions suppose. The profit-orientation assumed to characterize 
private enterprise is a shorthand generalization of something far 
more complicated. A firm, like any other organization, only has 
goals to the extent that the people who control it have goals. The 
profit orientation of a firm reflects the pro£it orientation of equity 
holders, which is to say that those in control of an institution adopt 
policies in their own interest. A nonprofit institution is also run by 
individuals interested in their own welfare. 
Since the types of people who control nonprofit institutions 
may difJer from those who run profit-making enterprises, nonprofit 
institutions do behave differently in some circumstances than profit­
oriented ones.* But this behavior is not crucial as far as predicting 
* K. Davis investigates the implications for hospitals of alternative
behavio.ral assumption. 
the con.�1equences of regulation is concerned. Some studies have 
examin€:d the proposition that hospitals are organized to some degree 
to benefit docto:-s [see Pauley and Red is ch, and Perrow]. If hospitals 
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are a 11doctors 1 cooperative, 11 their nonprofit orientation is a legal 
reality but practical fiction, and hospital regulation will be essentially 
regulation of a profit-oriented group of doctors. 
Other studies have postulated different motives for those 
who operate nonprofit institutions. For the most part, these 
differences are aver how the returns from profitable activities are 
to be spent. _t>,. profit-seeking organization will use these returns 
t o  pay equity holders or to reinvest in other profitable activities. 
A nonprofit organization will usually spend these returns on unprofitable 
activities: on unnecessary expenditures (such as on capital investments 
that are monun1.ents to the officers), on providing unremunerative 
services (the counterpart to cross-subsidization in a regulated firm), 
on improving product quality beyond the level that its customers 
are willing to pay for, or simply on rising costs resulting from paying 
too little managerial attention to cost-efficiency [see Lee, Feldstein 
and Newhouse] ,  What is unlikely to differ significantly between 
profit and nonprofit enterprises is the price of a profitable service. 
In fact, the nonprofit enterprise, to the extent it operates in an 
unregulated and uncompetitive market, has a tendency to engage in 
the same inefficient practices that regulation creates for the 
profit-making institution, 
The desire for stronger regulation on the part of hospitals 
is certainly consonant with the manner in which nonprofit institutions 
tend to exhaust their profits. Both nonprofit and for-profit institutions 
seek to protect themselves from competition, but for different reasons. 
To the for-profit institution, insulation from competition increases 
the profitabilit>· and reduces the financial risk of investment in the 
industry. To the nonprofit institution, the additional revenue-earning 
potential of insulation from competition expands the financial resources 
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for doing ngood works. 11 To the indigent, the victim of an exotic illness 
that is expensive to treat, and the trustee wishing to construct the 
modern version of a pyramid in his own name, the uses of profits by 
the regulated nonprofit hospital have enormous value, and certainly 
a legitimate case can be made that nonprofits make better use of 
monopoly prices than do profit-making institutions. Bet for the 
broad rarige of hospital services, both types of institutions yield 
similar results: monopoly prices in excess of costs to the extent 
that market conditions permit. And with regulation, the outcomes 
become even more similar as the profit-making institution is induced 
by the regulators to engage in the same type of internal tax-subsidy 
policies and inefficiencies that tend to characterize the operations 
of the nonprofit institution. 
Consumer Po\verlessness 
Regulation is also said to be needed because it is necessary 
to deal with the unusual phenomenon in medical care in which the 
patient receives the service, the doctor chooses the hospital, and 
the insurer pays the bill. The basis of the argument ls the observation 
that nowhere in the system is an individual decision made with costs 
in mind (see Arrow and Reder]. Consequently, runs the argument, 
regulation is necessary to overcome the absence of an incentive 
for cost-reduction. 
The problem with this argument is that the conclusion is a 
non sequitur. Nowhere i.n our experience with regulation is there 
the slightest indication that regulation can instill more attention to 
costs than regulated industries would have on their own. 
The interest in apptying increasingly tighter controls o:n 
entry into the hospital industry provides an interesting point of 
departure to illustrate the problems with using regulation as a 
mechanism to control costs. Obviously, rapidly expanding capacity 
and dwindling occupancy rates are not, by themselves, the obj eC'tives 
of hospital administrators. They reflect individual decisions not to 
maximize beds, but to provide medical services at financially 
remunerative prices. The persistent overinvestment in facilities 
is based upon the belief that in the long run hospitals will not fail 
financially. This belief is surely going to be reinforced the greater 
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the extent to which third-party payers dominate the market and govern­
ment intervenors determin·e prices through strict cost-reimbu:rsement 
formulas, 
Suppose in this milieu a strict prohibition on further 
exPansion o.£ capacity is enforced. This in no way changes the 
motives and the financial environment in which former decisions 
to expand capacity had been made. It simply means the beds can no 
longer be a major resultant of the interaction between these motives 
and financial conditions. The inadequate incentives for cost-reduction 
and rational pricing would remain, as would the potential to use the 
price system to collect capital for other unnecessary expenditures 
besides unused beds. Controlling the number of beds will simply 
turn the attention of hospital administrators to other, perhaps even 
less desirable expenditures. Thus is the regulatory tar-baby conceived. 
Regulators -..v ill find their attempts to force efficiency upon a 
recalcitrant industry as leading only to ever more detailed and 
expensive regulation, prohibiting a lengthening string of unnecessary 
expenditures, but with no apparent long-run success in dealing with 
the general problem of rising costs. 
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Fair Representation 
hospital 
Another pro-regulation argument 'Ls that those who purchase 
services are well-enough organized to provide a countervailing 
force to hospitals before an administrative agency. Certainly this 
argument is not without substance. Organizations such as B l u e  Cross, 
private insurers, the Social Security Administration, and other 
major payers are organized to plead their cases before a regulator. 
Their presence, a c cording to the theoretical arguments advanced 
above, should make regulatory outcomes rnore of a compromise 
than if regulators only talked to representatives of hospitals, 
Unfortunately, this does not mean that regulation will produce a 
better outcome than even the present system. 
The position of those not represented by a third party 
payor will probably be weakened under regulation. Today such 
patients face a multiplicity of hospi.tals with some degree of 
indepi:;� ndence in making dec isions on prices and service quality. 
Although hospital 11shopping1' is ad!nittedly difficult, it nevertheless 
is possible for some consumers. With regulation, decisions on 
prices will be centralized, to be decided in an adversary process 
in which these patients are unlikely to be represented. Whatever 
the value of the minimal shopping and bargaining among hospitals 
that now takes place, it will be lost under regulation. 
Probably more important is the change that regulation will 
make in the bargaining relation between major third-party payers 
and hospitals. ·Here the importance of independent decision-making 
£ h. d t s can deal with among hospitals is significant, or t tr -par y payor 
'd · ,. s for cost reduction hospitals individually and prov1 e some incen 1ve 
if they so choose. Regulation allov;1s hospitals to bargain as one 
before the regulatory authority, thereby avoiding the possibility 
that a more efficient hospital will strike a sptcial bargain that 
undercuts the position of other hospitals. In fact, one reason 
advanced b y  hospitals for the necessity of regulation is the ability 
of Blue Cross and the Social Security Administration to obtain 
11preferential" prices [see Cohen ]. The hospitals expect that a 
regulatory s ystem that allows them to bargain as a unit will 
produce a better result for hospitals than does a decentralized 
system. Further, they see a possibility for what appears to thi:;m to 
be a desirable cross-subsidy: charging equal prices to insured 
and uninsured patients even though the latter are more likely to 
default on p ayments and, therefore, are more costly to serve. 
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Finally, the interests of insured patients and insurers do not 
necessarily coincide, which makes third-party payers imperfect represen­
tati.ves of the interests of even insured consumers. Health insurance 
does not pay the same proportion of all hospital costs, so that 
insurers w i l l  benefit from cross-subsidization of highly insured 
treatments b y  less-insured ones. Furthermore, as long as profit­
oriented insurance companies can forecast ac curatel y ,  they are 
not necessarily affected adversely by price increases. The demand 
for hospital insurance depends upon the fin2.ncial risk of facing 
hospitalization without coverage. Risi.ng hospital prices cause 
insurance rates to rise, but they also increase.the risk of self­
insurance. Depending upon the consumer1s degree of risk aversion, 
and the sensitivity of his demand for hospital services to prices, 
rising hospital fees could lead to an increased demand for 
insurance, thereby benefiting insurers. And in states that regulate 
insurance by requiring that underwriting profits have some fixed 
relation to premiums and reimbursements, rising hospital costs 
can be the only mechanism, short of epidemic, for increasing 
insurance company profits. 
R egulatory Failure 
That r egulation of the quality of health care has failed to 
stem inflation in hospital costs and to maintain satisfactory 
standards of care i s  generally agreed. That this justifies further 
regulation is dubious. 
* 
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F o r  a while, the p r i c e  control programs initiated i n  1 9 7 1  
moderated infla tion i.n the entire e conomy, including hospital c a r e .  
This experience h a s  virtually n o  relevance t o  public utility regulation: 
price controls are temporary, are applied a c r o s s  the board to all 
indus tries ( i n s ulating the administrators from much of the special­
interest p r e s sures affecting regulato r s ) ,  and a r e  administered b y  
a n  a g e n c y  having n o  re sponsibility t o  maintain stability i n  any 
particular industry. For a discussion of the relation between price 
controls and public utility regulation, see Noll, 1 1 Pri.ce Comrni. s s i.on. 1 1 
The preceding arguments suggest that a central cause of 
the problems besetting the hospital industry is the set of ins titutional 
a r rangements i.nsulating hospitals from market incentive s .  Impo sing 
public utility regulation upon the existing system i s  probably the 
only step that could be taken to make the industry even more insulated 
from incentives to be efficient. Any s y s tem that separates the payer 
from the r e ci:;>ient of service will be prone to ineffic ienc i e s ;  impo sing 
regulation on such a s y stem s imply adds one more group whose tastes 
for uneconomic services and inefficient operations must be served. 
Abandoning regulation i s  not n e c e s s arily equivalent to 
abandoning medical care to the quacks. If the problem with a medical 
care delivery s ystem based upon cost incentives ( e . g . ,  extensive 
coinsurance or p_repaid group health) is a tendency to utilize consumer 
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ignorance to provide ineffectivz, low quality service, a more s e n s ible 
approach is to control performance directly. Various licensure, 
ce rtification and a c c reditation regulations in theo r y  are designed to 
achieve this, but they exact too high a price in preventing innovation 
and in entrenching the power of specific profess ional groups. More 
effective is the re gulation of health outcomes in a more consis tent, 
compreh ensive and s c i entific manner than the medical malpractice 
suit ( see Havighur s t] . 
Generally speaking, regulation to impo s e  mini.mum performance 
standards is more succe s sful than public utility regulation: airlines 
are safe and growing safe r ,  despite the inefficiencies in their pricing 
and operation s ;  emissions from automobiles and smokestacks are 
falling rapidly. This i s  not to say that minimum standard regulati.on 
is always s e n s ible, efficient and effective, but merely that s ome 
evidence can be found that it can produce noticeable r e s ults 
c o n s i s tent with its aims. 
Experience indicates that society does relatively better 
b y  centralizing quality decisions while r e l ying upon individual, 
decentralized decisions,  based upon market incentive s ,  for achieving 
c o s t  efficiency. Ilnposing public utility regulation on the present 
system moves in precisely the w rong direction: it r e l i e s  upon 
individual d e c i s ion-makers or homogeneous, self-interested 
profe s s ional groups to make decisions on the qUality of service i n  
a n  arena i n  w h i c h  the consumer h a s  no reas onable expectation of 
being able to judge quality, but it relies on cumb e r s ome, centrali:ied 
decision -making to promote effi ciency. A ne c e s s a r y  component 
of promoting efficiency is introducing the threat that a bad decision 
will lead to financial difficultie s ;  and a necessary component of 
a s s uring that minimum quality standards are met is to make sure 
that s omeone r e pre senting the consume r ' s  inte r e s t  has a role in 
passing judgment on the selle r 1 s  decisions about quality. It i s  
difficult to conceive of an institutional framework more removed 
from this latter model than one in which the present s ystem is 
amended by grafting on public utility regulation, 
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